London 2012 and the impact of the UK’s Olympic and Paralympic legislation: protecting commerce or preserving culture?

The general commercial rights associated with the Olympic Movement are protected in the UK by the Olympic Symbols etc (Protection) Act 1995. In addition, the UK Government, in response to a requirement of the Host City Contract with the International Olympic Committee, created the London Olympic Association Right under section 33 and Schedule 4 of the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006. These provisions enable the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games to exploit, to the fullest extent, the commercial rights associated with the London Olympic Games. This article questions whether the IOC’s requirement for legislative protection and state enforcement of the commercial rights are compatible with the Fundamental Principles of Olympism as defined in the Olympic Charter, and its stated aim of being a celebration of sporting endeavour, culture and education

On simplicial commutative algebras with Noetherian homotopy

In this paper, a strategy is developed studying a simplicial commutative algebra A whose zeroth homotopy group is a Noetherian ring B and whose higher homotopy groups are finite over B. The strategy replaces A with a connected simplicial supplemented k(q)-algebra, for each prime ideal q in B, which preserves much of the Andre-Quillen homology of A. The methods for this construction involves a mixture of methods of homotopy theory (e.g. Postnikov towers) with methods of commutative algebras (e.g. completions, Cohen factorizations). We finish by indicating how these methods resolve a more general form of a conjecture posed by Quillen.Comment: 10 page

Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Acto of 1979: Background, Provisions, and Cost

[Excerpt] The American automobile industry has serious financial problems. Corporate executives from the Big Three (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) have testified before Congress about their need for federal credit (direct loans and guaranteed loans). This report examines the Chrysler loan guarantee program for possible insights that could assist Members of Congress in evaluating proposals to provide federal credit assistance. In 1979, Chrysler applied for federal loan guarantees. In 1979 and 1980, the economy was in recession and the price of oil had unexpectedly increased dramatically. However, at that time there was no financial liquidity crisis, as is the case today. Most of the arguments for and against the proposed Chrysler loan guarantee program are relevant to current proposals for credit assistance to the Big Three. For example, in the 1979 debate, proponents argued that the Chrysler loan guarantee would save many jobs. But opponents contended that the financial capital obtained for Chrysler by the proposed loan guarantee would have been used by other firms to expand their productive facilities, output, and employment. Thus, any Chrysler job losses could be offset by gains at other firms. Provisions in the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 included the establishment of a Chrysler Loan Guarantee Board, extensive federal oversight of Chrysler’s operations, detailed reporting requirements by Chrysler’s management, shared sacrifice of parties benefiting from the loan guarantee, and protection of the federal government’s interest. Chrysler used federal loan guarantees to borrow $1.2 billion of the$1.5 billion available and redeemed its guaranteed loans in 1982. Some critics argued that Chrysler was only able to return to profitability because of the imposition by the U.S. government of “voluntary” import quotas on Japanese vehicles. In 1980, the Chrysler loan guarantee was treated as a contingent liability with no initial cost at the time the guarantee was provided. Because Chrysler repaid all of its guaranteed loans, the U.S. government incurred no budgetary cost. Furthermore, the U.S. government received warrants to buy Chrysler stock, which it subsequently sold at auction to Chrysler for $311 million. Thus, it can be argued that the U.S. government made a profit from the loan guarantee program. Currently, the Federal Credit Reform Act requires that the reported budgetary cost of a credit program equal the estimated subsidy costs to the taxpayer at the time the credit is provided. For proposed legislation establishing a new credit program, the Congressional Budget Office is responsible for making the initial estimate of the subsidy cost. Once legislation has been enacted, the Office of Management and Budget estimates the subsidy cost on the credit program. An appropriation for the annual subsidy cost of each credit program is made into a budget account called a “credit program” account. Thus, under today’s budgetary rule, legislation providing direct loans or loan guarantees to assist the automobile industry would require the inclusion of the estimated subsidy cost, which would require an appropriation of budget authority. This report will be updated as issues develop and/or in the event of new legislation

Excited Dark Matter versus PAMELA/Fermi

Excitation of multicomponent dark matter in the galactic center has been proposed as the source of low-energy positrons that produce the excess 511 keV gamma rays that have been observed by INTEGRAL. Such models have also been promoted to explain excess high-energy electrons/positrons observed by the PAMELA, Fermi/LAT and H.E.S.S. experiments. We investigate whether one model can simultaneously fit all three anomalies, in addition to further constraints from inverse Compton scattering by the high-energy leptons. We find models that fit both the 511 keV and PAMELA excesses at dark matter masses M < 400 GeV, but not the Fermi lepton excess. The conflict arises because a more cuspy DM halo profile is needed to match the observed 511 keV signal than is compatible with inverse Compton constraints at larger DM masses.Comment: 4 pages, presented at Moriond Cosmology 201